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The most natural way to think about “responsible innovation” is how the European Union and the 
scholars associated with the Journal of Responsible Innovation think about it – namely, in terms of being 
wise before the fact, when “the fact” consists in suboptimal, if not catastrophic, impacts for a broad 
range of constituencies in the wake of some proposed innovation. In that case, one tries to anticipate 
those consequences with an eye to mitigating if not avoiding them altogether. This is normally the 
territory of the precautionary principle, according to which innovations with great capacity for harm – 
regardless of benefits – would not be introduced at all. “Responsible innovation” tries to take a more 
moderate line, recognizing the generally beneficial character of innovation but insisting on monitoring 
its effects as it is unleashed on society and the larger environment. The guiding idea is that one might 
have one’s cake and eat it: Innovations would be collectively owned to the extent that those potentially 
on the receiving end would be encouraged from the outset to voice their concerns and even 
opposition, which will shape the innovation’s subsequent development. 
But one needs to be responsible not only before the fact but also after the fact, especially when “the 
fact” involves suboptimal impacts, including “worst case scenarios”. This is the opposite of 
anticipatory governance. Call it precipitatory governance. Precipitatory governance operates on the 
assumption that some harm will be done, no matter what course of action is taken, and the task is to 
derive the most good from it. I say “derive the most good” because I do not wish to limit the range 
of considerations to the mitigation of harm or even to the compensation for harm, though I have 
dealt with that matter elsewhere (Fuller and Lipinska 2014: ch. 4). In addition, the prospect of major 
harm may itself provide an opportunity to develop innovations that would otherwise be seen as 
unnecessary if not utopian to the continuation of life as it has been.  
Here I refer to the signature Cold War way of thinking about these matters, which the RAND 
Corporation strategist Herman Kahn (1960) dubbed “thinking the unthinkable”. What he had in mind 
was the aftermath of a thermonuclear war in which, say, 25-50% of the world’s population is wiped 
out over a relatively short period of time. How do we rebuild humanity under those circumstances? 
This is not so different from ‘the worst case scenarios” proposed nowadays, even under conditions of 
                                                     
*Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, UK, S.W.Fuller@warwick.ac.uk     
 In Praise of Precipitatory Governance as  
(Meta-)Principle of Responsible Innovation 
2 
 
severe global warming. Kahn’s point was that we need now to come up with the relevant new 
technologies that would be necessary the day after Doomsday. Kahn believed that this was a politically 
more tractable strategy than trying actively to prevent Doomsday, say, through unilateral nuclear 
disarmament.  
Indeed, Cold War policymakers did largely follow Kahn’s advice. And precisely because 
Doomsday never happened, we ended up in peacetime with the riches that we have come to associate 
with Silicon Valley, a major beneficiary of the US federal largesse during the Cold War. The internet 
was developed as a distributed communication network in case the more centralized telephone system 
were taken down during a nuclear attack. This sort of “ahead of the curve” thinking is characteristic 
of military-based innovation generally. Warfare focuses minds on what’s dispensable and what’s 
necessary to preserve – and indeed, how to enhance that which is necessary to preserve. It is truly a 
context in which “necessity is the mother of invention”. Most importantly, we win even – and 
especially – if Doomsday never happen. 
The most disruptive innovations in peacetime – such as the automobile or the personal 
computer – tend to be seen as “necessary” only after the fact, once they have systematically 
reconfigured the market. Before the fact, they are often seen as speculative, if not risky. Nevertheless 
they manage to make headway by exploiting vulnerabilities in the market leaders. Historically a major 
source of those vulnerabilities has been the market leaders’ relative lack of resilience to changes in 
aspects of the environment over which they have little control. This is the spirit in which to get into 
precipitatory governance. 
Thus, one might pose a question of this sort: Suppose the climate science consensus is correct 
that the Earth’s average temperature will rise by at least two degrees Centigrade by the end of this 
century. Which human groupings, institutions, technologies, and so forth are likely to survive and 
possibly flourish under these conditions, and which ones not? Those placed in the latter category 
should be seen as ripe for entrepreneurial investment now – not necessarily to prevent the global 
temperature rise but to ensure that the most overall benefit is gained from a situation that is both 
highly likely and prima facie suboptimal. The source of that benefit would be the removal of some of 
the preconditions that had made those now endangered people and practices so adaptive in the past. 
In effect, the impending catastrophe will have broken what sociologists call “traditions” and 
economists call “path dependencies”, which had made a “business as usual” attitude so attractive for 
so long.  
An interesting economic precedent for this general line of thought is what the mid-twentieth 
century Harvard economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) called “the relative advantage of 
backwardness”.  His basic idea was that each successive nation can industrialise more quickly by 
learning from its predecessors without having to follow in their footsteps. The “learning” amounts to 
innovating more efficient means of achieving and often surpassing the predecessors’ level of 
development. The “advantage” here comes from not having to bear the burden of a particular past, 
such as the well-documented path to industrialisation taken by England, starting with the Enclosure 
Acts in the early seventeenth century.  
A post-catastrophic humanity would be in a similar position to benefit from this sense of 
“backwardness” on a global scale vis-à-vis the pre-catastrophic humanity – provided that the record 
of human knowledge remains relatively intact in the wake of even the greatest catastrophe. This is not 
a trivial assumption, to be sure, but ongoing projects of digital archiving and curation of everything 
from artefacts to organisms make it an increasingly plausible one, regardless of one’s views on 
humanity’s exposure to “existential risk”.   
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Whenever military history is written with the wisdom of hindsight, precipitatory governance 
is often implied. Thus, those who like their winners to remain winners and losers to remain losers find 
it disconcerting to learn, say, how much West Germany and Japan benefitted from having been on 
the losing end of the Second World War, such that by the 1960s they were global socio-economic 
trend-setters. Nevertheless, once time has healed enough wounds, such a turn of events is generally 
seen as having been a good thing, even if the conditions precipitating them were not.  
Moreover, the increasing economic rationalization of warfare, starting with the Second World 
War, has shifted the horizon of precipitatory governance from hindsight to foresight. Indeed, our 
times have witnessed the rise of private and corporate investors on the lookout to capitalize on major 
catastrophes, natural or human in origin. An exemplar of this tendency is the Halliburton Company, 
which specializes in infrastructure projects in oil-rich regions of the world, places in periodic need of 
reconstruction due to their susceptibility to military conflict. One can decry Halliburton’s sweetheart 
deals and adventurism, yet admit that in their self-serving way they are in the business of precipitatory 
governance.  
Behind this relatively sanguine attitude towards the potential benefits of catastrophe is a 
controversial idea, namely, that the competences associated with creation and destruction are 
fundamentally similar, or in Stalin’s homely quip, “You can’t make an omelette without breaking some 
eggs”. In both cases, there are two key elements in the application of force: concentration of resources 
and strategic focus. Of course, destruction is potentially “creative” only to those empowered in its 
wake. But this may simply reflect an ability or willingness to see deeper benefit in apparent harm, 
perhaps by expanding one’s spatio-temporal horizon. The ethical and political challenge facing the 
advocate of precipitatory governance is to make credible this intuition – which comes perilously close 
to reducing material harm to a failure of imagination. I have discussed this challenge in terms of moral 
entrepreneurship (Fuller 2011 : ch. 5, Fuller 2012 : ch. 4). 
Let me stress that precipitatory governance constitutes “responsible innovation” in quite a 
deep sense, albeit one relatively ignored in the literature. It is natural to hear in the phrase “responsible 
innovation” the idea that innovation might be irresponsibly undertaken, which in turn is something 
that should be avoided. However, I hear something different, namely, that innovation is inevitable and 
that the challenge is to extend range of “responsibility” throughout the entire innovation process. 
More to the point: Insofar as innovation itself is seen as central to the promotion of the human 
condition, then it would be irresponsible not to provide for the promotion of innovation even in light 
of cases where particular innovations have led to catastrophic outcomes. In effect, precipitatory 
governance is an insurance policy against any anti-innovation backlash in the wake of a major 
catastrophe.  
Precipitatory governance is ultimately underwritten by the proactionary principle, the opposite of 
the precautionary principle (Fuller and Lipinska 2014 : ch. 1). Put crudely: If the precautionary 
principle commands “Do no harm!”, the proactionary principle commands “No pain, no gain!” More 
precisely, the two principles approach risk from opposing angles: the former risk-averse, the latter 
risk-seeking. Whereas the precautionary treats an uncertain future as a potential threat, the 
proactionary sees in it potential opportunities. To be sure, over the past decade, the two positions 
have developed in relation to each other to such an extent that some have questioned whether they 
should be seen as absolute opposites (Holbrook and Briggle 2014). I continue to do so for purposes 
of normative clarity.  
My guide here is Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued that we all have “dirty hands” regardless of 
whether our actions are seen as having caused a net harm or a net benefit to the world. Even the most 
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precautionary policies that aim to lower the level of risk in the environment – say, by prohibiting 
genetically modified organisms or lowering carbon emissions – incur opportunity costs with regard to 
the development of science and technology, which also need to be put on humanity’s balance sheet 
when assessing the prospect of future generations. After all, the harm “prevented” by having taken 
certain courses of action (e.g. to lower environmental risk) and the harm “caused” by not having taken 
certain courses of action (e.g. to promote science and technology) are equally speculative, by virtue of 
their reliance on counterfactuals. Nevertheless, we tend to accord greater realism to the former sort 
of counterfactual, perhaps due to its tie-in to action explicitly taken in this world. Generally speaking, 
such intuitive asymmetry has favoured the precautionary principle. However, the law is sensitive to 
the cognitive bias involved here, which it tries to redress by devoting considerable attention to 
culpability through negligence.  
To be sure, precipitatory governance appeals to a broader conception of negligence than is 
normally entertained in the law. Specifically, it includes neglecting to promote the innovative capacity 
of human beings. This idea is not entirely without precedent in the law. One thinks of the original 
justifications for patents and copyrights in the early modern period (Fuller 2002 : ch. 2). However, 
what gives precipitatory governance its distinctly proactionary spin is a shift in the modal standing of 
innovation: from something permitted (perhaps incentivized) to something obligated. Again, this shift 
is not without precedent. Consider policies that aim to provide “equal opportunities” for each 
successive generation, which the United Negro College Fund memorialized in its 1971 ad campaign 
as “A mind is a terrible thing to waste”, implying that a young mind will be wasted unless actively 
cultivated. Thus, a generation that might be otherwise left behind is given a “head start” by providing 
them with skills for a future whose uncertainty is interpreted as potentially a level playing field, in 
which default forms of advantage (and disadvantage) need no longer be in effect. This is, of course, a 
more recognizably “progressive” route to reach largely the same state of mind into which Herman 
Kahn frightened Cold Warriors, in which “ground zero” creates the level playing field. In both cases, 
the concern is not simply our responsibility for innovation but to it. 
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